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 1 
Michael Higgins 
Populism and security in political speechmaking: the 2008 US Presidential 
Campaign 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The issue of security has been a prominent feature of the US political landscape since the 
attacks of 9/11.  Not surprisingly, then, issues of security, trust and credibility were raised 
throughout the 2008 US election presidential campaign.  In the latter stages of his 
presidency, George W. Bush had been engaged in portraying his two terms as a 
successful period as national protector, keeping the US safe from further terrorist attack.  
Both the policy and the rhetorical strategies of the Bush administration coalesced around 
an emphasis on ‘homeland security’.  As well as producing a dominant way of asserting 
political legitimacy, this put in place an administrative framework within which elected 
legislators had to situate themselves, including the candidates for the 2008 presidential 
election.  Although they engaged in these debates in quite different ways, it is significant 
that all but one of the candidates for 2008 participated in the policy framework of 
homeland security.  Prospective Democrat President Barack Obama sat on the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, while his prospective Vice-
President Joe Biden sat on the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and 
Homeland Security.  Outside of the committee setting, while Obama avoided supporting 
Bush’s most controversial security measures, prospective Republican President John 
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McCain voted for the Patriot Act in 2001 and in 2006, and for the Homeland Security 
Department Appropriations Act in 2006 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008).  McCain’s 
prospective Vice-President Sarah Palin’s record on security is less established, through a 
simple consequence of having spent less time in political office and remaining in state 
governorship.  We will go on to see, however, that Palin’s contribution to the Republican 
tactic of articulating security with national self-interest offered some telling insights into 
the communication of politics. 
 
While the overall rhetoric of security has been directed inward, prioritising a concern 
with ‘home’, it has included a significant exclusionary strand.  Rees (2009: 108-9) 
emphasises that this concern with homeland security established a regime of shared 
practice that allowed Washington to strengthen some of its international partnerships 
(such as the UK) while temporarily marginalising certain, troublesome others (most 
notably France and Germany).  In spite of the emphasis placed on Washington’s short 
term squabbles with a number of longer-term allies, Rees (2009: 109) points out that 
implementation of the resultant policy initiatives on matters such as airport security and 
the pooling of intelligence, require a level of international cooperation at stretches 
beyond the rhetoric.  However, the contention here will be that while the notion of 
‘homeland’ holds out a virtuous arrangement for all national administrations that adopt 
similar codes of governance, the concentration on domestic well-being extends into the 
realm of economic and ideological interest. 
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In any event, security was a key selling point for the Republican ticket.  This issue was 
framed, on the one hand, around personal credibility.  The McCain campaign developed 
their approach to security and national safety, by drawing upon McCain’s history as a 
prisoner of war in Vietnam and his image as a maverick politician that has shown a 
willingness to take uncompromising decisions.  While these were selling points in 
McCain’s campaign for the primary elections of 2000 (see Wallace, 2008), in 2008 they 
had been emphasised by the release of McCain’s ghost-written commentaries of 
courageous decisions Hard Call (McCain and Salter, 2007).  The assertion of a link 
between the capacity to deal with security issues and political and personal experience 
was not an argument confined to the Republican campaign.  In the Democratic primaries 
too, Hillary Clinton ran an advert asking whether it is she or Barack Obama that has the 
understanding to deal with a 3am call to the White House concerning an urgent matter of 
security.  Also significant, however, was Obama’s response was that experience is of 
little use when it is disabled by dogmatism, in a strategy to assert a self-interested 
parochialism on the part of his opponents.  As we will see, much of the election discourse 
of both sides centred on setting security concerns within various national or international 
parameters.   
 
Where the relatively inexperienced Sarah Palin contributed to the Republican rhetoric on 
security was to draw upon the rhetorical force of the ‘homeland’ in ‘homeland security’.  
Palin operated to place the experience and credibility of McCain in a particular context, 
and to emphasise the national self-interests involved.  She performs this role using 
strategies associated with the traditions of political populism, and an understanding of the 
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modes of populist address in Palin’s speeches help us to see how these boundaries of 
concern are established.  What’s more, these can be fruitfully compared alongside similar 
strategies in the speeches of Barack Obama, which we shall see are directed towards 
different ends. 
 
 
Populism and leadership 
 
References to populism routinely drive debates around political culture, both in the 
academy and more broadly.  According to Margaret Canovan’s (1981: 261) book-length 
treatment, populism as expressed by the political classes is the drive to tailor ideas so that 
they appear to spring from ‘the people’ rather than any political, economic or 
bureaucratic elite.  This stems from a laudable in itself association between political 
power and subaltern collective action.  As Hannah Arendt (1998: 201) remarks ‘the only 
indispensable factor in the generation of power is the living together of people’.  At least 
in principle, populism is the art of negotiating and implementing policies that appeal to 
these collectives.  Populism also draws upon an equally admirable insistence that ‘public 
will’ should have a bearing on political policy.  ‘The people’ are therefore presented as 
the foremost agents of political change. 
   
Of course, populism is only one means of fostering an illusion of collectivity and 
representativeness.  In its meaningful form, the expression of populism depends upon the 
presence of a ‘charismatic leader’ and their claims to represent this ‘popular will’ against 
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an unrepresentative system.  Over the course of the presidential election, the main 
candidates were routinely assessed on their capacity to ‘connect’ with voters in particular 
ways:  Obama through oratory skill, the promised change of mixed-race ethnicity and 
youthful vitality, and McCain by drawing upon his proven loyalty and courage, and 
maverick image.  In her more recent work, Canovan (2002) acknowledges that populism 
is better understood as a series of political strategies than a political ideal, such that it 
offers a ‘thin-centred’ rhetorical basis for claiming political representativeness.  What 
may be construed as the emptiness of the politician aligning themselves with the 
populace does not detract from the rhetorical force of its appeal, however, and even the 
most vacuous petitions to ‘the people’ offer what Abts and Rummens (2007: 408) 
describe as ‘a central signifier which receives a fundamentally monolithic interpretation’.  
The populist address is simple and it tends to work.  For all its emptiness, arguments 
against an effective populist strategy are positioned such that they seem to gainsay the 
popular will.   
 
The effective populist address is also designed to avoid feeling especially political.  The 
key terms of Obama’s campaign, such as ‘change’, ‘trust and ‘hope’, the latter also taken 
up in Obama’s (2006) political writing, are designed to evoke shared human potentiality 
rather than disputable political values.  Regis Debray writes that what is offered is not so 
much the rancorous posturing of political division, as ‘a fraternity that keeps us warm’ 
(Debray, 1983: 142).  The promise is that if you listen and believe, you will never be 
alone.  In the past, this emphasis on inclusiveness and belonging is what has lent 
populism some degree of elasticity.  Ernesto Laclau (1977) uses the concept of 
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‘articulation’ to illustrate how populist discourses can be conjoined with established sets 
of political beliefs expressing a variety of contradictory interests.  In Laclau’s vision, one 
in which he draws heavily upon Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony, the battle over 
populist legitimacy is more crucial to victory than any claim to political or ideological 
credibility.  Populism therefore offers a means to forego acknowledgment of foundational 
political and economic interests.  In short, populism presents an empty rhetorical style 
readily adaptable to whatever political agenda is at hand.  
 
The analysis of populism 
 
The focus of Regis Debray is on the use of pronouns in devising a populist address, and 
this has also guided the ‘critical discourse analysis’ of political language.  Norman 
Fairclough (1989: 180) looks at the use of pronouns by Margaret Thatcher to claim 
solidarity with her listeners, ‘to pass off her practices, perceptions and precepts as those 
of ‘the people’ in general’.  Even elsewhere on the political spectrum, Fairclough (2000: 
30) observes a strategy of inclusive pronominal usage in the speechmaking of ex-Labour 
Prime Minister Tony Blair that ‘rests upon the constant ‘commonsensical’ equivalence of 
country, nation and business’.  Higgins (2004), moreover, shows how the terms of even 
the most outwardly stable inclusive address can shift to accommodate whatever political 
agendas happen to be convenient.  While pronouns are every bit as useful for potentially 
non-inclusive illocutionary acts of political discourse such as promising or requesting, the 
populist utility of the pronoun is largely in keeping with what Brown and Gilman (1972) 
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describe as their shift away from the expression of power differentials to that of a 
‘solidarity ethic’. 
 
This analysis will look at the speechmaking of Sarah Palin, with a particular 
concentration on the acceptance speech for her nomination as candidate for the Vice-
Presidency.  The mechanism for looking Palin’s speech will be the straightforward one of 
examining patterns of pronominal usage.  The first suggestion to emerge from the 
analysis will be that the clustering of pronouns enables us to comprehend the structure of 
the speech, as well as allowing us to see how the speech discharges its various purposes; 
including accepting the nomination, McCain and selling Palin herself.  Partly, Palin’s 
speech will prove to be an exercise in managing different personae, and Drake and 
Higgins (2006) argue that successful political speechmaking draws upon an ability to 
shift between ‘frames’ (Goffman, 1986): speaking for oneself at one moment, and 
expressing party loyalty the next.  The suggestion here is that analysis of pronominal 
usage can show us how these shifts are managed.  The second suggestion will be that 
Palin’s use of pronouns gives us an insight into a particular form of political populism, 
such that she embodies a shift in populist address from the inclusive address of old, to 
one centred on the self and the experiential 
 
So if Sarah Palin embodies an interesting development of populism, in what terms is 
populism integrated into US political culture?  In a history of the topic, Michael Kazin 
(1998: 12) gives the American brand of populism a number of characteristics.  First, it is 
rooted in the Christian-protestant social mores of the US, drawing upon such metaphors 
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as ‘Judas, sin and redemption’ to offer emotive expressions of loyalty, error and repair.  It 
is also founded on a timeless notion of ‘Americanism’, as a ‘creed for which 
independence had been won and that all genuine patriots would fight to preserve’.  This is 
a doctrine that presents America as ‘an isolated land of virtue whose people were on 
constant guard against the depredations of aristocrats, empire builders, and self-
aggrandizing officeholders both within and outside its borders’ (Kazin, 1998: 12).   
 
Yet from the beginning, the viability of ‘the people’ to whom this popular sentiment is 
addressed has been in doubt.  Kazin suggests that the original notion of ‘people’ was 
‘more incantation than description’, borne of political fervor mixed with the religiosity of 
such accomplished rhetoricians as Adam and Jefferson.  Amongst ‘the people’ so-
addressed, the effectiveness of this reading would wear off during the first round of tax 
hikes, and the Massachusetts farmers, to name just one group, set out to question in 
whose name executive power was being exercised (Kazin, 1998: 13).  Yet, Kazin (1998: 
14) is keen to emphasise, even these early rebellions were founded on an interest-based 
‘producerism’, determined to assert the rights of the small businessman against the state.  
What was being addressed, in other words, was the effectiveness with which the populist 
ideal was being pursued rather than the integrity of populism itself. 
 
Palin on Palin, and security 
 
I turn now to the contribution Sarah Palin can make to our understanding of populism, 
and how she uses this in supporting the Republican agenda on homeland security.  The 
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introduction has already discussed the ways in which Palin is distinguishable from both 
McCain and the Democratic candidates by her lack of experience in the national 
legislator: a factor that was incorporated into the Republican campaign as evidence of a 
critical distance from ‘Washington elites’ together with their perceived special interests.  
It is also commonly accepted that the addition of Palin to the Republican ticket was an 
attempt both to attract women voters that might have opted for Hillary Clinton and to 
introduce youthful vitality and allure into the McCain campaign.  If not for the extent of 
her grasp of core principles, therefore, there is ample evidence that Palin was chosen for 
the forms of rhetoric made possible by the terms of what Street (2003) describes as a 
public personae.  And in the event, her impact upon many core Republican supporters has 
been significant; with much of the resulting praise directed towards her campaign 
speeches.   
 
There are a number of possibilities available for us to analyse Palin’s speechmaking, 
many of them relevant to debates around political populism.  As Steven Pinker (2008) 
recently wrote in the New York Times, one way of explaining Palin’s appeal amongst the 
Republican base is the folksiness of her speech style.  She talks of ‘kids’ rather than 
‘children’, routinely drops her g’s, and uses what Pinker describes as ‘cutesy near 
profanities like ‘darn’, ‘heck’ and ‘doggone’’.  While these qualities are important 
towards understanding the political personae represented by Palin, there are other patterns 
in Palin’s speech that give more precise insights into what Pinker describes as Palin’s 
‘governing philosophy’; in particular, the manner in which she draws upon, asserts and 
manages a set of personal and professional credentials.   
 10 
 
The speech that is of immediate interest is the one that marked Palin’s appearance on the 
national political stage, where she accepted the nomination as prospective vice-president 
on the Republican Party ticket.  I want to begin my discussion of this speech by making 
two points.  First, there is a notable series of thematic clusters in Palin’s use of the first 
person singular, which correspond to different phases in the integration of the speaker’s 
public persona and experiential competence into the speech.  Tokens of ‘I’ are contained 
within four stages of the speech, leaving prolonged passages of the speech – one in 
particular – in which there are none.  These four phases are ‘formal acceptance’, 
‘credential claim’, ‘simple soul fallen amongst politicians’, and ‘concluding formal 
support’. 
 
The first and fourth stages of the speech can be examined together, which are ‘the formal 
acceptance’ and ‘the concluding formal support’ phases respectively.  These are the 
bookends of the speech in which Palin enacts the ritual of accepting the nomination for 
the Vice Presidency.  This extract is from the speech’s opening:   
 
(1) I accept the call to help our nominee for president to serve and defend America.  I accept the 
challenge of a tough fight in this election... against confident opponents ... at a crucial hour for our 
country.  And I accept the privilege of serving with a man who has come through much harder 
missions ... and met far graver challenges ... and knows how tough fights are won - the next 
president of the United States, John S. McCain 
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As Max Atkinson (1984) points out, the art of political speechmaking is the choreography 
of applause, and even this formalistic opening uses well-worn techniques of political 
rhetoric.  Specifically, Palin works ‘I accept’ into what Atkinson (1984: 57) describes as 
a ‘three part list’ designed to ‘project’ the name of her senior running mate, John 
McCain. 
 
There follows a brief period in which Palin expounds upon the positive qualities of 
McCain.  She uses what is still the developmental stage of the speech to assert the 
credentials of McCain as a guardian of national security.  This is expressed first by means 
of an implicit claim on McCain’s unstinting allegiance to nation, setting this against a 
mythical political establishment.  Palin says: ‘It was just a year ago when all the experts 
in Washington counted out our nominee because he refused to hedge his commitment to 
the security of the country he loves’.  The theme is then developed through the 
affirmation of a direct link between McCain’s innate qualities and his approach to current 
security policy: ‘He’s a man who wore the uniform of his country for 22 years, and 
refused to break faith with those troops in Iraq who have brought victory within sight’. 
 
Palin then shifts into what can usefully be described as ‘the credential-claim phase’.  This 
is characterised by a period of switching between Palin evidencing her position as an 
‘ordinary’ American in the ‘just your average Hockey mom’ mould, and Palin asserting 
her place as the engaged political advocate.  Extracts 2, 3 and 4 function as assertions of 
ordinariness combined with feistiness on Palin’s part; on the one hand, lending a tone of 
humility to her family status by deploying ‘just’ as a hedge designed to convey modesty 
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and ordinariness rather than downplay the message (extracts 2 and 3), while placing no 
such conditions on the description of her motive to action (‘because I wanted to make my 
kids’ public education better’).  Extracts 4 and 5 demonstrate how Palin turns her claim 
of ordinariness into political advocacy, moving from the presentation of a ‘message’ to 
the quasi-contractual speech act of the ‘pledge’: 
 
(2) […] that is exactly the kind of man I want as commander in chief. I'm just one of many moms 
who'll say an extra prayer each night for our sons and daughters going into harm's way. 
And in April, my husband Todd and I welcomed our littlest one into the world, a perfectly 
beautiful baby boy named Trig.  I grew up with those people.  
(3) I was just your average hockey mom, and signed up for the PTA because I wanted to make my 
kids' public education better.  
(4) To the families of special-needs children all across this country, I have a message: For years, 
you sought to make America a more welcoming place for your sons and daughters.  
(5) I pledge to you that if we are elected, you will have a friend and advocate in the White House. 
 
A consistent characteristic of these claims to representativeness is the association 
between the experiences of Palin’s background with the responsibilities of her political 
career.  Extract 2, for example, calls explicitly upon the audience’s knowledge of Palin’s 
own special needs child.  Similar links between down-home representativeness and the 
possibilities of political advocacy continues through these following extracts: 
 
(6) When I ran for city council, I didn't need focus groups and voter profiles because I knew those 
voters, and knew their families, too.  
(7) Before I became governor of the great state of Alaska, I was mayor of my hometown.  
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The bearing of Palin’s experience might well be opened to debate – most notably the 
implication that techniques for encouraging citizen engagement in the capital of Alaska 
would function just as well at a national level – but the rhetorical force of the comparison 
stems from Palin’s strategic separation of the technical and exclusionary lexicon used in 
extract 6 to describe the back-stage activities of political elites – referring to ‘focus 
groups’ and ‘voter profiles’ – and extract 7’s positive framing of the elected positions that 
Palin has occupied. 
 
The next section of the speech, which follows on almost immediately, may be described 
as the ‘simple soul, fallen amongst politicians’ phase.  Having already constructed an 
opposition between the honest McCain and a craven political establishment, this is the 
section of the speech in which Palin draws upon her own homespun credentials to 
develop a contrast between her and those had previously named as ‘experts in 
Washington’ and that she and the Republican strategists describe as the ‘Washington 
elite’:   
 
(8) And I've learned quickly, these past few days, that if you're not a member in good standing of 
the Washington elite, then some in the media consider a candidate unqualified for that reason 
alone.  
(9) But here's a little news flash for all those reporters and commentators: I'm not going to 
Washington to seek their good opinion - I'm going to Washington to serve the people of this 
country. Americans expect us to go to Washington for the right reasons, and not just to mingle 
with the right people.  
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(10) While I was at it, I got rid of a few things in the governor's office that I didn't believe our 
citizens should have to pay for. That luxury jet was over the top.  I put it on eBay.  I also drive 
myself to work.  And I thought we could muddle through without the governor's personal chef - 
although I've got to admit that sometimes my kids sure miss her. I came to office promising to 
control spending - by request if possible and by veto if necessary.  
 
Palin expresses this, first, in terms of a conflict in political interest which, in extract 8 
casts her as the naïve interloper and, in extract 9, as the outsider determined to hold fast 
to their own values.  In extract 10, she goes on to express this role of the outsider in a 
mocking denial of the material excesses of central government.  Taken together, all of 
these extracts draw upon what John Wilson (1990: 62) describes as the claim to sincerity 
implicit in the use of ‘I’ in political speeches.  Also, by pretending to eschew the normal 
strategies of political research, not needing a ‘focus group’, Palin consolidates her claim 
to be an ordinary person having to engage with the political classes as a painful duty, but 
while remaining one of the people supposedly represented.   
 
Outside the frame of her political speeches but within the professional contexts that 
Goffman (1971) would describe as ‘front stage’ and in public view, Palin expresses this 
role in a performance of easy and informal courtesy.  An illustrative example of this was 
Palin’s handshake with her Democratic counterpart Joe Biden prior to their televised 
debate, where she asked, in a pseudo-private exchange only just audible over the 
applause, ‘Can I call you Joe?’.  Also, the claim expressed in extract 3 that Palin is ‘just 
your average hockey mom’ proved to be a resilient item of political shorthand, successful 
in combining an apparently common touch with an investment in what Angela Smith 
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(2008) highlights as the moral grounding of the politicians’ family.  Much of the 
subsequent press coverage of Palin’s speech picked up on and emphasised this ‘hockey 
mom’ sobriquet.  Palin too returned to the description in a image-enhancing display of 
levity designed to mitigate her aggressive role in the Republican campaign, where she 
constructed a question and response joke around the name for the benefit of a Republican 
audience: ‘What is the difference between a hockey mom and a pitbull?  Lipstick.’  Not 
only a genuinely ordinary and homespun representative, then, but feisty, determined and 
uncompromisingly protective as well. 
 
Palin therefore engages in a mode of rhetoric carefully designed to generate sympathetic 
popular sentiment amongst what she and her party see as a core constituency.  John Street 
(2003) discusses such political strategies as these in terms established by P. David 
Marshall’s work on the operation of celebrity.  The status of the celebrity, Marshall 
(1997: 204) argues, is built upon an ‘affective function’ with the audience – not only to 
appeal to the audience but to cultivate an emotive response and attachment within them.  
Street suggests that his drive for an affinity with the audience governs the selling of 
political personalities every bit as much as other public personalities.  Accordingly, 
strategies are conceived across the realms of both politics and entertainment to market 
personalities as knowable and appealing.  Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1996: 517) describes 
political advertising as an attempt to make candidates recognisable and distinctive, and 
‘expose their temperaments, talents and agendas for the future in a favourable light’.   
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Such that Palin asserts her position as the everywoman that chance and commitment has 
taken to the political stage, she represents a political personality that has been fashioned 
along populist lines.  Palin’s public persona is built around the contours of her own 
domestic background and concerns for the interests of those close to her.  Her claims to 
ordinariness are concretised by references to her family (extract 2), her disabled child 
(extract 4) and what she presents as a gut empathy with the regular US voter (extract 5).  
All of this operates in parallel with an explicitly stated mistrust of the Washington-based 
system of government (extract 8) and a determination to visit the benefits of her common 
sense upon what she presents as a Washington elite (extracts 9 and 10).  In this way, 
Palin’s lack of experience in the administration of security is presented as lending a 
uniquely sincere dimension to her faith in McCain’s competence to manage national 
security. 
 
Where Palin’s expressed concern with the interests of the US everywoman is most 
significant in policy terms is where she situates security within the context of a defined 
set of material interests.  These are patterns that serve to emphasise the ‘homeland’ 
component of homeland security.  The following two extracts are drawn from the latter 
part of Palin’s speech, in which her patterns of pronominal usage shifts outward, 
extending first to an inclusive ‘we’ and then shifting again towards the listening audience 
as ‘you’: 
 
(11) To confront the threat that Iran might seek to cut off nearly a fifth of world energy supplies, 
or that terrorists might strike again at the Abqaiq facility in Saudi Arabia, or that Venezuela might 
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shut off its oil deliveries, we Americans need to produce more of our own oil and gas.  And take it 
from a gal that knows the North Slope of Alaska: we’ve got lots of both.  
(12) What exactly does [Obama] seek to accomplish, after he’s done turning back the waters and 
healing the planet?  The answer is to make government bigger, take more of your money, give you 
more orders from Washington, and to reduce the strength of America in a dangerous world.  
 
In extract 11, Palin draws upon the supposed folk-knowledge of the ordinary Alaskan 
(albeit from her position as state governor) to respond to a series of asserted international 
threats, from Iran, Venezuela and the enemies of Saudi Arabia.  This ‘we’ that is under 
threat is first named explicitly as the US electorate (‘we Americans’) and then reasserted 
in terms of implied shared ownership (‘we’ve got lots of both’).  It is in extract 12’s 
direct address to this electorate that Palin expands upon the theme of a US-under-threat 
(from a ‘dangerous world’).  She, on the one hand, lists a series of emaciating 
developments that would inevitably result from an Obama administration (the growth of 
external control and the lessening of personal wealth), while at the same time deploying 
‘you’ to impose an opposition between electorate themselves and the order-givers of 
Washington. 
 
Having offered some reflections on the construction of Sarah Palin and its significance, it 
is useful these populist strategies are common across the election campaign; in particular, 
in the speeches of Barack Obama, since highlighted for their persuasive and inspirational 
qualities (Sanders, 2009: 235).  In a number of important respects, any comparison 
between Palin and Obama will appear to be strewn with difficulties.  For one thing, their 
speeches are influenced by the different positions they hope to take within the executive, 
 18 
with the differences in expressive freedom and power these bring.  Palin is at least 
partially impeded from presenting herself as an agent of political change by her position 
as prospective Vice President rather than President, and we have seen that she 
ameliorates this by foregrounding her claim to be an outsider.  Obama, on the other hand, 
is obliged to present himself as enactor of the Democratic political agenda.  Yet, for all 
these key points of distinction, the relationship between Palin and Obama is an important 
one.  Palin was recruited to the Republican ticket to give voice to the party’s attacks on 
Obama, allowing McCain to retain the demeanour of the statesman he had established in 
the 2000 presidential primaries, generous to all and above politicking (see Wallace, 
2008).  Although McCain’s avuncular detachment was to be compromised as poll ratings 
began to recede, specifically in the October televised debate, McCain’s lines of attack 
had already been ventriloquised by Palin: in particular, that Obama had associates with 
terrorist and anti-American connections.  Taking the role that Obama occupied for the 
Democrats, there is an important sense in which Palin was therefore used as a primary 
definer of the Republican campaign, setting the terms of the Republican agenda. 
 
In common with Palin, a survey of the use of personal pronouns in Obama’s nomination 
acceptance speech shows the extent of the emphasis on his own background and the 
competence his own experiences give him to serve.  In that speech, Obama even 
acknowledges that the narrative behind this rhetoric is becoming well-worn with the line 
‘Four years ago, I stood before you and told my story’.  Although the clusters of 
pronominal usage are less pronounced in Obama’s speech than in Palin’s, where they 
were separable into distinct phases, there are a number of similarities.  Specifically, and 
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to use the terminology adopted for Palin, Obama includes a prolonged formal acceptance 
phase, and a brief ‘simple soul fallen amongst politicians’ phase.  However, what 
distinguishes Obama’s speech from Palin’s is Obama’s extensive use of the inclusive 
pronoun to refer to the American people.   
 
But before we look at any extract from Obama’s speech, it is worth dwelling on the terms 
and significance of this mode of inclusivity in Palin’s speechmaking.  While Palin 
overwhelmingly uses inclusive personal pronouns to refer to herself, her family, her 
administration, and those presumed to be in communion with the Republican Party, 
extract 11 highlighted the one passage in which she deploys ‘we’ in a manner that 
includes the US people.  This is the passage that carries on that nationwide address: 
 
(13) Our opponents [the Democrats and media] say, again and again, that drilling will not solve all 
of America's energy problems - as if we all didn't know that already.  But the fact that drilling 
won't solve every problem is no excuse to do nothing at all.  Starting in January, in a McCain-
Palin administration, we're going to lay more pipelines ... build more new-clear plants ... create 
jobs with clean coal ... and move forward on solar, wind, geothermal, and other alternative 
sources.  We need American energy resources, brought to you by American ingenuity, and 
produced by American workers.  
 
When it is viewed in the context of extract 11, it is clear that the final inclusive pronoun 
in this extract is designed to include the US electorate as a whole, having been 
established by the immediately-preceding specification ‘we Americans’.  The first two 
tokens of ‘we’ and the initial ‘our’ refer to a Republican administration – on the basis that 
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only they will have the power to act to ‘lay more pipelines’ – but are sufficiently 
ambiguous to extend to the listening audience and US population (who are invited to 
assent to the laying of such pipelines).  On the basis of extract 13, it is also apparent that 
the nation addressed has the common bond of material concerns, as in ‘we need’, as well 
as the material possessions of extract 11’s ‘we’ve got’.  Crucially, these are presented as 
interests that are best served by the energy policy approved by Palin and the Republican 
Party, thereby collapsing together national belonging, material interests, and an affinity 
with core Republican beliefs.   
 
This use of a strategic inclusivity to respond to environmental issues has not been 
confined to the presidential campaign.  This following extract is taken from a speech 
Palin gave in October 2007 to a local chamber of commerce in her capacity as Governor 
of Alaska: 
 
(14) More and more we’re being challenged to balance the need for development with the need to 
protect our natural resources. 
 
Just as in extract 13, where one of the pronouns refers to the administration, so there is 
some ambivalence here in whether the ‘we’ is that of the nation, the Alaskan people, or 
the competent authorities.  While it is a plausible explanation to see this as an example 
what Harvey Sacks (1992: 713) describes as an ‘organisational pronoun’ that has the 
effect of both depersonalising action and emphasising institutional duty, what might be 
read as a tactical uncertainty between an inclusive versus an exclusive ‘we’ results, in this 
case, in nation, administration and Republican Party being presented as one.  
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Obama on America and safety 
 
We can turn now to Obama’s nomination acceptance speech for the Democratic 
presidential nomination.  In this speech, Obama uses inclusive pronouns far more 
frequently than Palin, spreads them more evenly through the speech, and deploys them in 
a quite different way.  These are two extracts: 
 
(15) Instead, it is that American spirit - that American promise - that pushes us forward even when 
the path is uncertain; that binds us together in spite of our differences; that makes us fix our eye 
not on what is seen, but what is unseen, that better place around the bend. 
 
(16) America, we cannot turn back.  Not with so much work to be done.  Not with so many 
children to educate, and so many veterans to care for.  Not with an economy to fix and cities to 
rebuild and farms to save.  Not with so many families to protect and so many lives to mend.  
America, we cannot turn back.  We cannot walk alone.  At this moment, in this election, we must 
pledge once more to march into the future.  Let us keep that promise - that American promise - 
and in the words of Scripture hold firmly, without wavering, to the hope that we confess. 
 
What is again notable is the relative indeterminacy of this inclusiveness.  The ‘we’ that 
pledges to ‘march into the future’ may either be interpreted exclusively (to mean Obama 
and his proposed administration), or inclusively (to encompass the whole American 
people) (Fairclough, 1989: 127-128).  The most likely interpretation – aided substantially 
by the repeated invocation ‘America, we cannot turn back’ – is that this is a national 
‘we’.  Even though, as John Wilson (1990: 33) argues, this warming embrace is routinely 
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predicated upon a more chilling threat to national and therefore ‘our’ well-being, 
Obama’s address is purposefully centred on an abstract and yet socially progressive idea 
of American belonging, centred on his evocation of politically-inspired ‘hope’; consistent 
through the Democratic campaign merchandise and Obama’s (2006) own political 
writing.  In terms of the shared techniques of choreographing audience response 
(Atkinson, 1984: 108), and in a way that is consistent with extract 16’s assertion of 
political beliefs and shared morals over explicit material interests, Obama’s mode of 
inclusiveness can be placed in the oratory tradition of Martin Luther King.  Obama’s 
style is partly that of a man seeking political converts, and who produces what 
Montgomery (2000) describes as an unbounded ‘we’ designed, at least in terms of the 
rhetoric, to reach across national boundaries. 
 
However, when Obama turns to the issue of security, a set of concerns he recasts as 
‘threat’ and ‘safety’, he uses pronouns in a quite different way: 
 
(17) That’s not the judgment we need.  That won’t keep America Safe.  We need a President who 
can face the threats of the future, not keep grasping at the ideas of the past 
 
(18) We are the party of Roosevelt.  We are the party of Kennedy.  So don’t tell me that 
Democrats won’t defend this country.  Don’t tell me that Democrats won’t keep us safe.  The 
Bush-McCain foreign policy has squandered the legacy that generations of Americans – 
Democrats and Republicans – have built, and we are here to restore that legacy. 
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In extract 17, ‘we’ is contained with the category of those within the political 
constituency of the American President, and operates as a direct appeal to the national 
body politic.  Included in this is an implicit attack on his electoral opponents: they are, it 
is implied, grasping at the ideas of the past.  In extract 18, however, Obama sets about 
defending his own security credentials by occupying a role as representative and defender 
of the Democrat Party, using an exclusive form of ‘we’ in order to express this 
illocutionary position.  That is, the dominant pattern to emerge from Palin’s rhetorical use 
of pronouns is to implicate the national body within her rhetoric on security, and to align 
this with a set of political beliefs and material concerns.  Where Obama discusses 
security, on the other hand, the dominant theme is an evocation of his own party’s history 
of trustworthiness and dependability.  In sum, Palin’s discourse on security is founded 
upon a mythical ‘American people’, and sets them against an aloof and wrong-headed 
state machine, whereas Obama seeks to defend the possibilities of the responsible and 
diligent state. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Palin and Obama pursue similar rhetorical strategies, such that they draw upon their own 
backgrounds to establish both the experiential credibility to speak, and to cultivate an 
affinity with the listening audience.  As Willner (1984) points out, fostering the illusion 
of both of these characteristics and others are defining qualities of the charismatic 
politician across political traditions.  Palin, however, deploys a populist approach to her 
treatment of security and other issues, one that articulates her down-home 
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representativeness with particular political and economic interests.  Jeffrey Scheuer 
(2001) argues that the easy simplicity of populism suits the right-wing more than other 
points on the conventional political spectrum.  Alain Badiou (2008), for example, argues 
that the discourse of French President Nicolas Sarkozy depends upon a link between 
right-wing political populism and the generation of irrational fear.  Or to take a still more 
pertinent example, Robert Putnam (2001) claims that the self-interested materialism often 
associated with elements of the political right is better served by an unrelenting focus on 
the self and the actual over the politics of possibility and the more abstract notions of 
community that this entails.  Sarah Palin embodies a style of political rhetoric that draws 
vitality from her own material interests and beliefs, and who in turn projects her own 
ordinariness and representativeness onto those very interests.  The Republican version of 
populism, manifest in the figure of Palin, is one that accords with Kazin’s (1995) 
historical description as setting the interests of the common folk at odds with those of the 
governmental and business elites, but in this case channelled quite specifically through 
the her own experience and homespun wisdom.   
 
While the choice of Palin and her subsequent public profile was partly a response to the 
perceived elitism of Obama – in her speech she says ‘it's easy to forget that this is a man 
who has authored two memoirs but not a single major law or reform’ – the persona of 
Palin draws deeply from a well of ‘anti-intellectualism’ in the US.  However limited the 
constituency for these innate suspicions of learning and the establishment, Richard 
Hofstader (1964) traces them to the crafted simplicity and suspicion of central authority 
embodied in the Founding Fathers, and that Jude Davis (2006) has mapped onto George 
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W. Bush and other contemporary political figures.  But for all that, the rhetoric of Sarah 
Palin offers important lessons for many of the established views of populism beyond the 
future possibility of another major figure in the US executive perceived as lacking 
intellectual weight.  In turning the politics of personalisation towards a system of rhetoric 
based upon the interests of the self, Palin represents a form of populism peculiarly suited 
to the political right, and provides evidence of a need to think again about the strategies 
of populism in communicating politics on those issues that draw upon broader concerns. 
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